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Introduction
Historically, the international community’s response, or lack thereof, to mass atrocities, has been
shaped by the absence of timely and accurate information.1 The past two decades have witnessed
non-governmental organizations, international agencies, governments, and private sector actors
designing, adopting, and employing information communication technologies (ICTs) including
smartphone apps, remote sensing platforms such as satellite imagery analysis, surveillance drones
and other forms of digital data collection and analytics, as standard components of sectoral and
cross-sectoral responses to both the threat and alleged committal of mass atrocities in a variety of
operational and geographic contexts. Throughout this period, the use of ICTs has metamorphosed
from consisting of a series of prototype use cases of these tools and techniques to become a
commonplace component of the human rights and humanitarian sector’s response to mass atrocity
and human security crisis scenarios. Accompanying this mainstreaming is a set of generalized
and, to date, largely unsubstantiated claims that ICT changes the nature and effectiveness of mass
atrocity response.
So far, limited conceptual scholarly attention has been given to the progress-claims made on
behalf of ICT technologies and how these claims correspond to their actual impact on the broader
field of mass atrocity response. This is problematic, because this form of technology optimism, or
even utopianism, impacts the distribution of resources, field practices and the rules and norms that
regulate the use of these interventions. In this article, we contest the theory of change presented by
various actors in the mass atrocity field. According to this theory, ICTs are not only force multipliers
with respect to civil society’s ability to address atrocities, but the use of ICT in itself represents a
form of response that enhances the protection of civilians. In doing so, we make three arguments.
First, we argue that there is no evidence of the existence of what can be referred to as a
causal Protective or Preventative Effect (PPE) from the use of ICTs in mass atrocity producing
environments. In our coinage, the PPE is conceptualized as the following: The use of technology
in mass atrocity contexts are largely preceded by the encoding of assumptions and aspirations
into ICTs having an inherently Ambient Protective Effect (APE); i.e. casually transforming the
threat matrix of a particular atrocity producing environment in a way that improves the human
security status of targeted populations. Second, we suggest that more attention needs to be paid
to the reverse effect, namely that the collection and distribution of demographically identifiable
information (DII) in disasters can instead be a causal vector for harm. Building on Raymond, we
define DII as either individual and/or aggregated data points that allow inferences to be drawn that
enable the classification, identification, and/or tracking of both named and/or unnamed individuals,
groups of individuals, and/or multiple groups of individuals according to ethnicity, economic class,
religion, gender, age, health condition, location, occupation, and/or other demographically defining

1

Scott Strauss, “Identifying Genocide and Related Forms of Mass Atrocity,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 7
(2011), accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20111219-identifying-genocide-and-mass-atrocitystrauss.pdf. As observed by Strauss, conceptual clarity matters: For mass atrocity prevention and response alike,
it is necessary to have a working definition of the class of events that can trigger civic activity or political and
military responses. At the same time, the term “mass atrocity” covers a range of events (beyond common standards
such as genocide, crimes against humanity or mass violence) that are themselves the objects of contestation and
analytical confusion. For the purposes of this article, we take up the commonly understood notion of mass atrocity as
widespread and systematic violence against civilians.
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factors.2 We suggest that the absence of a shared theory of harm and a corresponding framework
for applying it to these new and evolving ethical challenges represents a key challenge. Third, to
that end, we begin to articulate the core components of such theory of harm with respect to the
use of ICT in mass atrocities. In our articulation, harm can arise from a wide array of technologybased practices, interactions and policy considerations in mass atrocity response. As a first step,
we need to do the work of linking data security (privacy and data protection) and cybersecurity
more comprehensively to human security. As a second step in our attempt to articulate a theory of
harm, we put forward the view that DII requires its own category and science of identifiable data
specific to itself. As a third step, we propose a closer focus on preparedness: We argue that mass
atrocity and human security fields more broadly are characterized by missing conversations about
tradeoffs before tech deployment. As a fourth step, we point to the need for greater reflexivity:
we argue that it is necessary for response actors to take the differences between the ideologies,
means, methods and objectives of humanitarian service provision and human rights truth
provision-oriented communities seriously, and to more consciously reflect on the significance of
this difference for one’s own work. The fifth element of our theory of harm relates to ourselves
as mass atrocity responders, and the ethical limits to how far we can go to digitally protect our
operations.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly describing the rise of ICT technologies
in mass atrocity response. We then argue that seen through the theoretical prism of technological
utopianism, the arguments made on behalf of ICT technologies go beyond the notion of
ICT as a force multiplier to claim that monitoring and information gathering may itself be
equated to enhanced protection of civilians.3 Next, we offer a four-pronged critique of the ICT
progress narrative. We flesh out the components of the ambient protective or preventative
effect; and describe the emergence of ICT as a site of ethical precariousness and as capable of
causing actual harm to the response, to responders, and most importantly, to civilians who
are the targets of mass atrocities. In the final part, we begin to lay out a theory of harm that
can help us understand and address this issue. We conclude by arguing that our attempt at
offering a theory of harm can assist in developing a means for logging and evaluating critical
incidents, including standard definitions and procedures used by funders, governments, and
local communities to evaluate past projects and prevent the infliction of harm from similar, future
deployments.
The Rise of ICT in Mass Atrocity Response
These mass atrocity response specific uses of ICTs can include, but are not limited to, the following:
Satellite imagery collection and analysis4; surveillance drones5; the use of crowd mapping and social
media platforms6; and Big Data and algorithmic, machine-learning techniques to process large
volumes of digital data from multiple sources. Increasingly, these individual tools and techniques
2

Nathaniel A. Raymond, “Beyond ‘Do No Harm’ and Individual Consent: Reckoning with the Emerging Ethical
Challenges of Civil Society’s Use of Data,” in Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data Technologies, ed. Linnet Taylor et al.
(Cham: Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 2017), 67-82.

3

Christopher Tuckwood, “The State of the Field: Technology for Atrocity Response,” Genocide Studies and Prevention:
An International Journal 8, 3 (2014), 9. Our argument is concerned with different objectives than those articulated
by Tuckwood, who argues that “recent years have seen a marked decline in the brand of ‘cyber utopianism’ that
predicted the inevitable arrival of human rights and liberal democracy following rapidly on the heels of internet
access in many of the world’s dangerous places. Very few observers still believe that simply introducing an
unspecified category of tools labeled ‘technology’ will be the panacea to defend human rights and save lives.”

4

Tanya Notley and Camellia Webb-Gannon, “FCJ-201 Visual Evidence from Above: Assessing the Value of Earth
Observation Satellites for Supporting Human Rights,” The Fibreculture Journal 27 (2016), accessed May 21, 2017, http://
twentyseven.fibreculturejournal.org/2016/03/21/fcj-201-visual-evidence-from-above-assessing-the-value-of-earthobservation-satellites-for-supporting-human-rights/.

5

Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Kjersti Lohne, “The Rise of the Humanitarian Drone: Giving Content to an Emerging
Concept,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 43, no.1 (2014), 145-164; Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Maria
Gabrielsen Jumbert, The Good Drone (New York: Routledge, 2016).

6

Ryan Burns, “Rethinking Big Data in Digital Humanitarianism: Practices, Epistemologies, and Social Relations,”
GeoJournal 80, no. 4 (2015), 477-490.
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are now being integrated together into combined applications that seek to fuse together several
streams of data from different sources and formats into an amalgamated data product. While the
deployment of each of these technologies takes place in discrete fields (humanitarianism, human
rights, etc.) that are described and discussed by separate academic literatures, there is increasing
recognition of responsible data management as the key crosscutting issue.7
The specific applications of these technologies and platforms are diverse and constantly
evolving, but can be generally divided into two broad categories of prevention/response and
justice/accountability: the uses that seek to create unique situational awareness for population
protective purposes and informing response activities; and use cases aimed at detecting and/or
documenting evidence of alleged crimes for judicial and/or advocacy purposes. In recent years,
the intensifying adoption of the ICT technologies for mass atrocity response has commonly been
presented as an expedient and substantive response to the gross human rights abuses arising
from ongoing armed conflicts in non-permissive environments such as Syria, Iraq, South Sudan,
Yemen, Libya and others. Additionally, the adoption of these technologies appears to be spurred,
in large part, by a set of key factors, namely their comparatively low cost in comparison to other,
analog interventions and their ability to be remotely deployed in highly lethal, non-permissive
environments that preclude traditional, ground-based approaches.
“Hacking” Mass Atrocities: Technology Adoption as a Theory of Change
Thus, ICTs are now effectively treated as indispensable “force multipliers” that may either
supplement or, in some cases, supplant mass atrocity responses that rely on humans physically
making contact with other humans in the places where mass atrocity events are occurring. The
adoption of an ever more technology-reliant and increasingly “remote” posture has encoded within
it an implicit aspiration to literally predict, prevent and deter these crimes as a direct causal result
of deploying these modalities. We propose that this increasingly publicly expressed vision that
technology itself can fundamentally alter the calculus of whether and how mass atrocities occur
demonstrates that civil society actors have done more than simply adopt tools and techniques:
They have adopted a theory of change based on technological utopianism as well, a theory that
posits technological change is inevitable, problem-free and progressive.
Technological utopianism is a belief in technological progress as inevitable, and in technology
as the vehicle for “achieving a ‘perfect’ society in the near future.”8 This theory of change can
be illuminated through Morozov’s concept of “solutionism”, described as “the idea that given
the right code, algorithms and robots, technology can solve all of mankind’s problems, effectively
making life “frictionless” and trouble-free.”9 In the cybersecurity field, cyber-utopianism refers
to “a naïve belief in the emancipatory nature of online communication,” along with a refusal to
acknowledge any negative impact of the Internet on society.10 We argue that the emergence of ICTs
as a perceived remote, force multiplication capability for civil society actors responding to alleged
mass atrocities has, critically, dovetailed with the narrative that more information about a mass
atrocity producing situation can intrinsically increase the chances of preventing or mitigating these
scenarios. As Pryce writes in How to Prevent a Mass Atrocity,

7

Nathaniel A. Raymond, Ziad Al Achkar, et al, “Building Data Responsibility into Humanitarian Action,” United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (2016). Also, Nathaniel A. Raymond, Caitlin Howarth, and Jonathan
Hutson, “Crisis Mapping Needs an Ethical Compass,” Global Brief 6 (2012), accessed May 21, 2017, http://globalbrief.
ca/blog/2012/02/06/crisis-mapping-needs-an-ethical-compass/.

8

Howard P. Segal, “The Technological Utopians,” in Imagining Tomorrow: History, Technology and The American Future, ed.
Joseph J. Corn, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).

9

Ian Tucker, “We are Abandoning All the Checks and Balances,” The Guardian, March 9, 2013, accessed May 21, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/mar/09/evgeny-morozov-technology-solutionism-interview.

10

Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Milton Mueller,
What is Evgeny Morozov Trying to Prove? A Review of the Net Delusion (Internet Governance Project, 2011), accessed May
21, 2017, www.internetgovernance.org/2011/01/13/what-is-evgeny-morozov-trying-to-prove-a-review-of-the-netdelusion.

©2017

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 1 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1454

Sandvik & Raymond

12

Early warning networks in countries at risk are essential, whether they involve tapping into
worldwide Diasporas for the wealth of knowledge and contacts they provide, or making use
of cell phone technology for immediate access to unfolding events.11

It should be noted that this perception is supported and reinforced by similar developments in
adjacent fields of human security-related rescue and response. Generally, with the rise of Big
Data, data visualization has become central to the understanding of societal problems and their
potential solutions.12 In the field of humanitarian action, a key driver behind the rise of technology
is the increasing conflation between information and protection: embedded within the embrace of
extensive monitoring is the implicit promise of better performance.13 More broadly this is connected
to the widespread notion that “knowing about atrocities” through imagery and other data streams
somehow mobilizes empathy and engenders political action.14
Herscher describes how the public viewing of images was understood to motivate public action,
and how, with the Eyes on Darfur Campaign, the public viewing of satellite images was viewed as
public action in itself.15 In a different example, an October 2010 report from ICT4D Foundation
expresses the decidedly solutionist aspiration that the deployment of these technologies themselves
can realize a “dream of rescue” for imperiled populations succinctly, stating:
Civil society is becoming increasingly involved in the search and design of digital
innovations for addressing the challenges of genocide. A recent example is Project 10^100, a
competition hosted by Google, where the idea of creating a genocide monitoring and alert
system was one of the sixteen finalists. The ideas included reducing crimes against humanity
by aggregating data, including pertinent statistics, the history and geography of specific
conflicts, local cultures, geostrategic interests, by using e.g. updated dynamic web maps and
hand-held GPS devices…Done well and over the long-term, initiatives like these can prevent
recurrence of genocide and mass atrocity crimes.16

As a result, the goal of using technology in mass atrocity response has become more ambitious than
simply how these tools and techniques can better help responders simply collect, make sense of,
and act upon information derived from ICTs. Somehow the use of technology may fundamentally
short-circuit how, whether, and to what degree these abuses actually occur.
Contesting the ICT Progress Narrative
Power and Political Economy
In this part, we offer four lines of critique of the ICT progress narrative. The first concerns power
and political economy. We argue that an initial problematic aspect of this idea of “hacking” mass
atrocities is the invisibilization of existing and emergent power relationships: hence, for us, it is
not the (contestable) newness of ICT for mass atrocity response that must be investigated, but the

11

Michael C. Pryce, “How to Prevent a Mass Atrocity,” (n.d), accessed May 21, 2017, http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/
articles-on-genocide/.

12

Katharina Rall et al, “Data Visualization for Human Rights Advocacy,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 8, no. 2 (2016),
171-197.

13

Tina Comes, Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Bartel De Walle, “Cold at Heart: A Critical Review of Technology for Keeping
the Cool in Humanitarian Cold Chains.” (Manuscript on file with authors). Also, Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Katja
Lindskov Jacobsen, UNHCR and the Struggle for Accountability Technology, law and results-based management, (Abingdon,
Oxon: Routledge Humanitarian Studies, 2016).

14

Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown, Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

15

Andrew Herscher, “Surveillant Witnessing: Satellite Imagery and the Visual Politics of Human Rights,” Public Culture
26, no. 3, 74 (2014), 469-500.

16

Caroline Hargreaves and Sanjana Hattotuwa, “ICTs for the Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes,” Report on the World
Summit on the Information Society Stocktaking, ICT for Peace Foundation (October 2010), 4, accessed May 21, 2017,
http://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ICTs-for-the-Prevention-of-Mass-Atrocity-Crimes1.pdf.
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power it represents.17 Technology is not neutral. Instead of society passively adopting technology,
technology and society engage in a mutually constitutive relationship.18 Nevertheless, we do
believe that the diffusion of non-human objects generates new political settlements,” which, in
themselves, constitute a form of institutional power, rather than an elimination of it.19
Understanding the political economy of ICT mass atrocity practice is important for
understanding power relations.20 Essentially, ICTs can serve as a platform on which hegemony
can be promoted and existing power imbalances be reinforced, shifting the balance towards
powerful institutions if the latter are able to strategically use ICTs as legitimating tools.21 This
also links to a more instrumental rationale of technological utopianism, namely that confident,
solutionist claims made on behalf of technology’s ability to address mass atrocity are part of a
moral economy whereby established industry actors and startups developing and promoting ICT
solutions are trying to gain legitimacy, visibility and a leg up in the burgeoning business of global
emergencies under the heading of “humanitarian innovation,” “peace innovation”, and so forth.22
Commentators have noted that generally, in the Tech for Good sector, technology often appears as
a solution in need of a problem. This is also the case in mass atrocity response where “the choice
of technology used for prevention activities sometimes appears to be supply-driven as opposed
to demand-driven.”23 Similarly, many utopian progress claims have been made in the name of the
arrival of “digital humanitarians” in the crisis response field (such as the Standby Task Force, the
Humanitarian Open Street Map and the Digital Humanitarian Network).24
In short, we suggest that the uses of ICTs by a diverse conglomerate of non-governmental,
governmental, and private sector actors centrally contains within it an assumption that the present
and future committal of mass atrocities can itself be somehow hacked; and that this assumption
serves as a vehicle for accumulating legitimacy, resources and projects. Meanwhile, the potential
negative consequences of hacking what is often the application of military means by state and
non-state actors is subsumed by the potential, though unproven, benefits of these inherently
experimental applications of technology.
The Myth of the Ambient Protective or Preventative Effect
Our second line of critique concerns what we call the myth of the protective or preventative effect.
Despite the broad adoption of ICT, and the broad claims made on behalf of its abilities to provide
change, we argue that there is no extant base of scientific evidence that in any way suggests, let
alone proves, the existence of what in our conceptualization can be referred to as a causal Protective
or Preventative Effect (PPE) from the use of ICTs in mass atrocity producing environments. We
put forward the idea that the Ambient Protective Effect (APE) is based on the assumption that
increased volumes of unique otherwise unobtainable data over large-scale geographic areas and/
or non-permissive environments may cause one, some, or all of the following four outcomes
to occur:
1.

Deterrent APE: Perpetrators are less likely to act because of threat of having action
documented.

17

See Tuckwood, The State of the Field.

18

Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, The Social Shaping of Technology (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999).

19

Daniel R. McCarthy, “Technology and ‘the International’ or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Determinism,”
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 41, no.3 (2013), 471, 489.

20

Ella McPherson, ICTs and Human Rights Practice, A report prepared for the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary,
or Arbitrary Executions, (2015), accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/251346.

21

Ioannis Tellidis and Stefanie Kappler, “Information and Communication Technologies in Peacebuilding: Implications,
Opportunities and Challenges,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no.1 (2016), 75-93.

22

Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Humanitarian Innovation, Humanitarian Renewal?” Forced Migration Review (2014), 25-27.

23

Francesco Mancini and Marie O’reilly, “New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict,” Stability:
International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 3 (2013).

24

Burns, Rethinking Big Data.

©2017

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 1 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1454

Sandvik & Raymond

14

2.
3.
4.

Public Outcry APE: Citizens in nations that have capability to interdict become more
activated to push for interventions/protective actions because of immediacy/undeniability/
uniqueness of ICT derived/transmitted evidence.
Actionable intelligence APE: Governments are given new intelligence that they otherwise
would not have, due to focus of NGOs on poorly monitored/lower politically valued
locations, which causes them to act.
Early warning APE: Targeted communities have early warning that enables them to make
better, quicker, more informed decisions that are potentially lifesaving.

Underlying these strands is a common conflation of how we intend technology to work and how we
predict and measure its effect. Hence, we argue that these aspirations for the effects of technology
use, effects that have frequently been seen as objectively resulting from its mere application, have
no objective foundation.
The Potential for Harm
Our third line of critique concerns the awareness and acknowledgment of the possible direct and
indirect negative effects of ICT. There are longstanding and well-articulated concerns about the
use of data for example in the human rights field: data is non-existent or of poor quality due to
collection problems or digital shadows; data suffers from bias; effective data analysis is hampered
by low levels of data literacy in the practitioner community and so forth. The concern is that
these weaknesses affect levels of credibility and accuracy, which is “the currency of human rights
advocacy.”25 However, over the last five years, the domain of mass atrocity ICT has in itself emerged
as a site of ethical precariousness.
As noted by Latonero and Gold, the “problem is that we simply do not know all the positive
and negative impacts these new technologies will bring, which makes it difficult to make informed
decisions in the present.”26 The problem is not only that well-intentioned data driven interventions
may fail to assist (through bad strategic planning, insufficient resources or inattentiveness to
context) but that they may even harm beneficiaries.27 An important aspect of this development is
what appears to be a very weak community-wide interest so far in the ethical dimensions of ICT
use for mass atrocity-producing contexts.28 Concerns have been emerging both with respect to
the practices of the volunteer and tech community, and the information practices of the “walled
garden” of human security professionals in the UN and INGO system.29
While many heavily promoted initiatives around cell phones proclaim that SMS codes can
save lives, these detection and documentation focused initiatives seem to be generally unconnected
to the response side of operations. Commenting on the celebrated crowd-seeded program Voix des
Kivus, Pham and Vinck note that “there were no known efforts to respond to or address incidents
or issues raised by cell phone holders.”30 Other times, information collection practices have lacked
transparency and accountability, leading to suspicion by individuals and communities providing
information.31
25

Rall, et al, Data Visualization.

26

Mark Latonero and Zachary Gold, “Data, Human Rights & Human Security,” Human Rights & Human Security (2015),
1-16.

27

Ibid.

28

Kate Crawford and Megan Finn, “The Limits of Crisis Data: Analytical and Ethical Challenges of Using Social and
Mobile Data to Understand Disasters,” GeoJournal 80, no. 4 (2015), 491-502.

29

Megan Finn and Elisa Oreglia, “A Fundamentally Confused Document: Situation Reports and the Work of Producing
Humanitarian Information,” Proceedings of the 19th ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) Conference on ComputerSupported Cooperative Work & Social Computing. ACM, 2016.

30

Phuong N Pham and Patrick Vinck, “Technology, Conflict Early Warning Systems, Public Health, and Human Rights,”
Health and Human Rights 14, no. 2 (2012), 106-117, accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2013/08/
technology-conflict-early-warning-systems-public-health-and-human-rights/. See also Alexander Austin, “Early
Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?” Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 129-150.

31

Finn, et al, A Fundamentally Confused Document.
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Additionally, and crucially, emerging, though limited, evidence is beginning to suggest
that the opposite of the intended PPE may, in fact, be occurring. A growing body of scholarship
indicates that the attempt to project a PPE through technology may be, in some cases, both exposing
affected civilian populations to new, rapidly evolving risks to their human security and negatively
mutating the behavior of alleged mass atrocity perpetrators. Technology can have unpredictable or
unpredicted knock-on effects: For example, crowd-sourced data is neutral in the sense that it can
also be used to foment violence, for example by creating a riot, instead of preventing it.32 In one
available example, there is qualitative evidence that the presence of ICTs may cause governments to
restrict a population’s ability to communicate, as well as facilitate actions that further violence and
make conflict dynamics more complex. Mancini and O’Reilly, discussing the use of ICTs during
violent crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, write:
In a context where the government restricted the use of new technology, ICTs appeared to
do little to facilitate a response from local authorities or international actors. On the contrary,
the government elected to shut down some mobile networks. At the community level, actors
using mobile phones and Internet websites did foster group action, but these technologies
were predominantly used to help mobilize violent mobs, issue threats to the opposing
community, and propagate conflict narratives.33

Another, primarily quantitative example indicates that ICTs may have, in at least one case, directly
increased violence against the very vulnerable populations that the deployment of these tools and
techniques was originally intended to protect. Gordon’s study of Amnesty International’s 20072008 Eyes on Darfur project, that monitored villages in the Darfur region of Sudan at risk for attack,
provides some of the first evidence of a potential causal relationship between ICT use and direct
harm on populations. Gordon argues that:
…Amnesty’s intervention increased violence in monitored villages and neighboring villages
during the program as well as in subsequent years. Coupled with qualitative data, results
suggest that the Government of Sudan increased violence to retaliate against Amnesty’s
advocacy efforts. This study highlights the potential for well-intentioned advocacy efforts
to generate perverse effects.34

It should be reasonably assumed, sadly, that the incidents described above are likely not the only
critical incidents that have occurred so far.
Lack of preparedness
Our fourth line of critique concerns the lack of collective consciousness and preparedness regarding
these emergent risks. Despite these concerns being raised by multiple voices over the course of
years, there has been no concerted, successful effort to date by the various sectors using ICTs in
human security crises to develop common ethical, technical, and rights-based standards for their
safe and responsible use.35 Several reasons likely exist for the failure of the human rights and
humanitarian sector to either proactively or responsively address the clear and present dangers
that these new modalities and methods present for the vulnerable populations these groups seek to
protect. We suggest that these factors may include concerns amongst practitioners that documenting
and releasing evidence of critical incidents having occurred during their ICT-based projects could
cause reputational damage and jeopardize current or future funding. Also of vital importance is a
32

33

Joseph G. Bock, “Firmer Footing for a Policy of Early Intervention: Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Comes of
Age,” Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 12, no. 1 (2015), 103-111.
Mancini, New Technology.

34

Grant Gordon, “Monitoring Conflict to Reduce Violence: Evidence from a Satellite Intervention in Darfur,” (2016),
accessed May 21, 2017, http://www.grantmgordon.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/GG-EoD.pdf.

35

See also Joseph G. Bock, “Technology and Vulnerability in Early Warning: Ethical Use of IT in Dangerous Places,”
Information Technology for Development, 22, no.4 (2016), 696-702.
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lack of technical and ethical fluency amongst funding and supporting organizations about how to
evaluate the potential harm these projects may inadvertently cause. Most critical, however, is the
absence of a shared theory of harm and corresponding framework for applying it to these new and
evolving ethical challenges.
Towards a Shared Theory of Harm
Regardless of the actual reasons for the lack of intentional and comprehensive action on these
issues, it is the last point – the absence of a shared theory of harm and a corresponding framework
for applying it – that represents the logical starting point for course correction by the sectors
and actors engaged in this work. As noted by Latonero and Gold, “Harms from data revelations
range from physical violence, to retribution, to shaming. Yet a more precise taxonomy of data
related harms is needed.”36 An accepted, evidence-based theory of harm specific to the potential
deleterious impacts resulting from current technical realities of the applications of ICTs in the mass
atrocity response context is the first step for the development of any ethical framework for guiding
this area of work.
In this article, we seek to articulate this initial theory of harm for ICT and digital data use in
the mass atrocity response context. Our goal of doing so is to hopefully initiate a discussion within
the fields of both research and practice that is grounded in reality, rather than in aspirations and
assumptions, about how to move beyond the “dream of rescue” and the unproven solutionist myth
of the PPE towards a rights-based ethical framework for these activities. With rights-based we
do not refer to the kind of impossible-to-articulate-and-to-meaningfully-implement rights-based
buzzword of the previous decade: our understanding is of rights-based as applying the rule of law
and existing data protection and privacy guarantees fully and responsibly to the human insecurity/
crisis response field, as well as the concerted effort to identify and develop legal protection
mechanisms for new threats posted by ICT use in the human security field.
Failure to develop an accepted theory of harm may mean that civil society will continue to
accept the current status quo indefinitely under the auspices of innovating mass atrocity response.
At the heart of the current context resulting from the absence of a shared theory of harm is a
perceived imperative by civil society to continue to test and deploy largely untested and nonconsented interventions in a host of worst-case scenarios because trying anything is seen as better
than doing nothing.
Evidence of the dangers of this perceived worst-case scenario innovation imperative can
be found in a recent case of the 2014-2015 West Africa Ebola Outbreak. During that crisis, Call
Detail Records (CDRs) were collected from mobile phone networks for the ostensible purpose of
tracing the spread of the disease. McDonald, in his paper Ebola: A Big Data Disaster describes this
phenomenon in the context of Ebola as “disaster experimentation”, writing:
The chaos of humanitarian disaster often creates an implied social license for experimentation
with new approaches, under the assumption of better outcomes. Vested interests dominate
the public discussion of humanitarian data modeling, downplaying the dangers of what
is essentially a public experiment to combine mobile network data and social engineering
algorithms. In the case of using mobile network data to track or respond to Ebola, the
approaches are so new–and generally so illegal– that most advocacy focuses on securing
basic access to data. Advocates for the release of CDRs often paint an optimistic picture of its
potential benefits, without applying the same rigor to the risks or likelihood of harm. This
trades on the social license created by disaster to experiment with the lives of those affected,
under the implicit assumption that it can’t make the situation worse.37

The presiding paradigm can be seen as fundamentally treating highly vulnerable populations
affected by extreme crisis events as experimental subjects of largely untested, non-consented,
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and remotely applied technological interventions.38 We are however concerned that as the scale
and depth of global connectivity increases, the scale and nature of cyber-insecurity is being
transformed from representing a nuisance or economic loss to encompass fundamental threats to
human security that may themselves contribute to mass atrocity targeting and committal.39 ICT
interventions in mass atrocity responses are often designed and deployed by actors often existing
outside the affected communities themselves. What’s more, the severity of the crisis event appears
to serve as justification by human rights, humanitarian, and private sector actors for routinely
abrogating certain categories of rights – i.e. privacy and human subject research protections - in the
stated service of an unproven theoretical protective effect. This approach to the use of ICTs in mass
atrocity producing contexts has inherently injected, however unintentionally, a utilitarian ethic of
greater goods and trade-offs into this work at the expense of the do no harm ethics traditionally
espoused by actors in this space. The phenomena of ad hoc prioritization of one set of rights over
another by outside actors utilizing technology creates implicit hierarchies of rights and operational
objectives that the subjects of these interventions have little to no consent as to whether, when, and
how they are imposed.
In this article, we argue that as a community, we are causing harm through the current paradigm
of deployment that will cause irreparable damage to populations in crisis and those who work
with them. As a critical community, we need to do a better job of articulating the components of
this claim. Without an accepted theory of harm grounded in the operational and technical realities
of this work, this utilitarian ethic of disaster experimentation will likely persist and continue to
evolve in unpredictable and dangerous ways. In our attempt to begin to articulate a theory of harm,
we include five lines of argument.
Cyber Insecurity as Human Insecurity
As a first step, while the case that legal rights are being violated is increasingly made40, we
need to do the work of linking data security (privacy and data protection) and cybersecurity more
comprehensively to human security.41 The protection of social identity has been considered a key
component of human security. We suggest that as social identity is increasingly constituted through
information technology, threats to data protection and privacy can usefully be understood to now
exist as core threats to human security. In 1994, the UN Human Development Report challenged
the state-centered conception of security as pertaining to geopolitical issues, exploring the “new
frontiers of human security in the daily lives of the people” by arguing that “[h]uman security is
not a concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity.”42 Human vulnerabilities
were therefore to be found across a range of issues, broadly categorized into security matters in
the community, the economy, and the environment, as well as people’s food security, and their
health, political and personal security. Since then, contestations over human security’s substance,
its definitions of threats and vulnerabilities have been thoroughly examined.43 We suggest that the
concept of human security deepens the understanding of threats to both privacy and data protection
by repositioning the physical individual at the center of the privacy and data protection discourse.
38
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Emphasizing the universality of the concept, and in contrast to the use of human security as a
foreign policy tool to look at “other” societies, we adopt Burgess and Tadjbakhsh’s inward-looking
perspective appraising personal integrity through data protection as an asset of value which
belongs to the vital core of mass atrocity response. Our ambition here is to set the stage for a harm
matrix by emphasizing the utility of human security as an analytic tool in order to comprehend
the globalization of the erosion of “personal liberties as trade-offs to national security” where the
individual moves to center stage; and to emphasize the way in which global civil society has become
engaged in the capture, storage and distribution of personal data in a way that alters its compact
with the populations it purports to act on behalf of.44 The concept of human security is useful
not only for the definition and identification of human in/securities, but also for evaluation and
critique of those practices which make people insecure.45 Considering the detachment of personal
data from the individual as a process of dehumanization, we argue that the human security
perspective, informed by stringent empirical analysis, can provide a theoretical starting point from
which scholarship may help to bring back the human and reconnect the individual with its body of
data now being generated in technologically driven mass atrocity responses.
What is the Risk: Ignoring Demographically Identifiable Information (DII)
A failure to understand the linkage between cyber security and human security; poor cyber
security approaches or even blatant mistakes of such as losing, dumping or inadvertently releasing
data can result in harm. Harm may also arise from a failure to calibrate the sensitive nature of
the information one is releasing or sharing with third-parties with substandard cyber security
practices or partners with commercial or political priorities that puts shared data at risk. Generally,
there has been an increasing, if insufficient, acceptance across the sector of the problems related
to collecting personal identifiable information (PII) from individuals in crisis; the challenges of
obtaining informed individual consent; and the issues raised by resorting to implied or “good
enough” consent.
However, we argue that DII is increasingly becoming a critical issue. It is critical in part
because DII is being explicitly subordinated to PII in standards used by crisis responders.46 While
there is some mention of demographic information, it is often presented as a subset of personal
identifiable information, such as name, age, ethnicity, etc. DII can include, though is not limited
to PII, online data, geographic and geospatial data, environmental data, survey data, census data,
and/or any other data set that can - either in isolation or in combination - enable the classification,
identification, and/or tracking of a specific demographic categorization constructed by those
collecting, aggregating, and/or cross-corroborating the data. 47
Hence, as a second step in our attempt to articulate a theory of harm, we put forward the
view that DII requires its own category and science of identifiable data specific to itself. This
absence of a clearly articulated concept of DII is striking given its critical role in now common
digital, networked data collection approaches, such as smartphone apps, social media, and any
crowd-sourced platform offered by the private sector. The lack of a standard definition of this
term is itself evidence of the enormity of the technical and doctrinal challenge that this type of
data presents for all fields of data science, not only humanitarian and human rights applications
of ICTs and the data derived from them. The importance of DII in civil society applications of
ICTs and the data derived from them cannot be overstated. It may be argued that most, if not
all civil society applications of ICTs and the data derived from them fundamentally aim to
collect, analyze, and create actionable products either initially based upon and/or seeking to
result in DII.48
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DII can be seen as, at first glance, ethically neutral by itself in many cases, without a seemingly
obvious ethical imperative for a practitioner to immediately act upon. For example, the 2013 Red
Cross Professional Standards for Protection Work, comparing the risks of aggregated data to
sensitive individually identifiable data, seems to underplay the risks of these aggregated data sets,
stating:
Protection actors working with aggregated information, such as trend analysis, do not face
the same challenges as the information they handle is less sensitive. They may feel less
concerned by the standards and guidelines of this chapter. They should nevertheless be
aware of the constraints of managing data on individuals and events, in order to understand
how the information they are handling has been obtained.

The more, seemingly subtle ethical implications of DII are in stark contrast to many common types
of PII encountered in the civil society context, such as raw, de-identified individual health records
or refugee registration documents. DII’s ethical implications largely results situationally from
when, how, why, and from what combinations of initial sources it is derived and applied, rather
than the more easily ethically categorized data that comprises PII. In other words, DII can result
from the transformation of seemingly disparate, unrelated data sets into an amalgamated data
product that can be easily weaponized into a means for doing harm. The potential harm of DII is
often most apparent, if not entirely, to the perpetrator of potential harm, rather than to the holder
of one or all of the pieces of a potentially actionable mosaic of DII.
Whereas PII’s potential harm comes from when it is leaked or breached, DII’s harm, and thus
its ethical implications, often emanates from simply whether the possibility exists that it can be
even created. This reality makes the overall ethical imperative to understand, manage, and protect
potential sources of DII as important, if not more so in some cases, than those commensurate with
holding only one source of PII.
Missing Conversations About Tradeoffs Before Tech Deployment Shape Outcomes
With new ways of seeing come new, correspondent ways of being blind. For example, with new
means of mitigating one potential harm or risk (i.e. remote sensing mitigating threat to staff
from deployment in dangerous environments) comes an increase in the potential willingness by
organizations to act in ways that might harm vulnerable populations in exchange for enhanced staff
protection through increased situational awareness. Another example concerns the application of
ICT in early warning approaches, and the tradeoff between speed and accuracy, which affects the
quality and reliability of the information collected.49 The most important category of examples,
however, concerns the uses of aggregate population data and personally identified data. These
tradeoffs are dynamic by nature: As noted by Latonero and Gold, in an acute crisis, concerns over
data privacy and data protection mechanisms may be low, but as the threat to life diminishes, the
equation changes. They note that “such tradeoffs require measured assessments which are often
unclear and ambiguous when data is readily available, easy to collect or simple to share.” 50
As a third step, we propose a closer focus on preparedness: We argue that mass atrocity and
human security fields more broadly are characterized by missing conversations about tradeoffs
before tech deployment: at its most general, this concerns the question of whether to deploy a
particular technology or not; the choice between technological modalities and eventually costs
and benefits in particular deployments. What’s missing is both a structured process for having
such conversations and a generalized perception that these conversations are intrinsic both to
preparedness and accountability efforts. This also involves a consideration of the kind of tradeoffs
taking place, but also the scope and nature of permissible tradeoffs: when does a particular class
of tradeoffs become unethical? At present, this evolving economy of largely undocumented tradeoffs related to technology are creating new power disparities and dichotomies that fundamentally
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favor the interests and operational needs of northern NGO, government, and corporate actors
over the rights and needs of the subjects of these deployments, in many cases. These trade-offs
are happening in often unacknowledged, sublimated ways that are left unsurfaced due to the
sometimes pervasive presumption that somehow tech application for situational awareness is
somehow separate and hermetically sealed off from risks incurred from ground interventions.
Ironically, it may be argued that in fact the scale and scope of ICT related harm may, in some cases,
potentially outstrip the harms incurred through ground action precisely because its remote nature
somehow removes the perception that it can be harmful.
Taking Difference Seriously: Understanding the Incongruity between Data for Humanitarian Service
Provision and Human Rights Truth Provision
This article focuses on mass atrocity response as part of the broader field of human security response.
While this broad and very common categorization is helpful to articulate general problems, it
also obscures fundamental differences in the objectives, practices, cultures and toolboxes of the
various communities of practice that aim to protect or rescue civilians. In our view, in particular,
this categorization obfuscates the growing split between human rights and humanitarians as
crisis responding communities. This includes how this split shapes and is shaped by each group’s
use of data and the impact the use has on crisis affected individuals and communities. It also
includes increasingly divergent perceptions of what responsible approaches to data collection,
maintenance, storage and sharing of data look like. Here, as a fourth step, we point to the need
for greater reflexivity: we argue that it is necessary for response actors to take the differences
between the ideologies, means, methods and objectives of these communities seriously, and to
more consciously reflect on the significance of this difference for one’s own work.
At the outset, the moral underpinnings of these two communities are different: Humanitarianism
is ideologically framed around the two imperatives of doing no harm and providing assistance
according to need; as well as around adherence to core humanitarian principles of humanity,
neutrality, impartiality and universality. The humanitarian field has a curious relationship to law
and legal regulation: there is an erstwhile and enduring implicit relationship with the IHL modality
of trade-offs; proportionality and acceptance of collateral damage if necessary for military gain. At
the same time, the law of humanitarian action is fragmented and consists in large part of soft law
initiatives surrounding service provision and the conduct of the service providers themselves in
contexts of mass atrocities, crisis and other operational scenarios.
The human rights crisis response community is heavily regulated by international human
rights law and core principles of non-discrimination. Human rights are also shaped by the regularity
of states of exception and suspension of rights in times of crisis. Where humanitarianism has a
problem with “politicization” of human security at the expense of responding to human need,
the human rights framework conjures up panoply of possible tradeoffs in the interest of securing
formal rights protection. As noted above, the product of the human rights community is accurate
and credible information about human suffering and rights violations. In short, this community
produces and provides “truth” in response to mass atrocities as the product of its operations.
These differences are highly relevant because they problematize the protection perspective:
whether you approach data as a means to service provision or as a means to the provision of
truth. These differences need to be taken into account as the mass atrocity community engages
more comprehensively in exploring how problem definitions shape and are shaped by technology
use. As noted above, a power perspective is required for making sense of how the interests of
the larger industrial, corporate humanitarian and human rights complexes shape idiosyncratic
notions of the harm matrix and where one’s own work is situated. We suggest that through the
insistence that one’s own work has no possibility for physical impact (only providing truth) or
is apolitical (only aiding the needy) members of each community not only wrongly attempt to
exclude themselves from the harm matrix in the individual instance, but contribute to systemic
abdication of responsibility for the potential harms caused by their data-driven interventions.
The Transformational Capacity of Cyber-Insecurity: Human Security Protection as Counter Intelligence?
The final element of our theory of harm relates to ourselves as mass atrocity responders. Some
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concern has been directed at the potential damage arising from “bad apples” intent on causing
harm by destroying or disrupting data flows. However, a more important and realistic danger is
posed by the widespread and near-permanent state of cyber-insecurity in which human security
responders find themselves, which may render them as vehicles for attacks by hostile actors. To
put it bluntly, when we worry about human rights actors as spies, that is quaint – the critical
concern is how what we are doing now provides capacities and capabilities for other people’s
spies. When civil society is cyber-attacked or cyber-exploited, it is not necessarily because attackers
want to stop our activities but because we are a surfboard to accessing additional sources and
methods in the control of civil society actors. Attackers are often mostly parasitic. This reality calls
for a greater understanding of the very utilitarian nature of cyber-attacks, not as targeted acts of
aggression violating rights to free speech or to organize, but as a business strategy – civil society is
fast becoming an access point to a smörgåsbord of data, devices and institutions. In short –we are
now an intelligence asset.
In practice, some human rights actors are taking the consequences of cyber vulnerability
seriously, actively developing offensive counter-strategies. These activities can involve wiping
context or providing malware to trace attackers. The result is, however, that we are becoming a
surveillance actor. For practitioners, intelligence capability produces a unique situational awareness
that is highly beneficial for advocacy. However, this capability also gives actors intending to commit
atrocities the ability to make otherwise unavailable real time decisions. This paradox raises an
important but little discussed issue: is it ethical for us to think about the fact that in the digital age, to
protect mass atrocity operations, we have to engage in counter intelligence, to prepare and counter
armed actors’ attempts to exploit us; to study their perceptions and capabilities? Are we allowed
to engage in deception and kinetic cyber counter-attacks against direct denial of service (DDS)
attacks, for example? What would engaging in counter measures mean for the core obligations of
human rights and humanitarian actors to protect civilians and respect human rights? Moreover,
in the short to medium term, another issue will arise that adds increasing complexity to the do no
harm imperative, namely the paradox of ICT counter intelligence activities becoming inextricably
linked to the notion of responsible and ethical use of ICT technologies in mass atrocity contexts,
resulting in the possibility that ethical ICT use can only happen with built-in counter intelligence
components. This potential paradigm fundamentally challenges the do no harm approach and
the sources of tradition and doctrine that have defined both humanitarian and human rights civil
society sectors.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to begin to articulate the components of a shared theory of
harm. Our concluding observations concern ethics and evidence. Developing ethical frameworks
to guide emergent technologies is a complex endeavor, and such frameworks have a temporary
nature. We are not advocating the adoption of a permanent convention or similar instruments.
What we are asking, is that the human security community broadly speaking—particularly
mass atrocity responders, such as humanitarians, human rights advocates and peace builders—
come to terms with the fact that there is a difference between knowing about alleged atrocities
and doing something about them; monitoring a mass atrocity crime is different and distinct
from preventing it or protecting against its effects. We are also asking that the members of this
broad and diverse community to begin to take seriously the fact that ICT use can cause real harm
to civilians.
We argue that there is a need to talk about critical incidents stemming from these interventions
openly and transparently— not as urban rumors, not as scandal but in the structured form of after
action processes. If we can’t collect evidence about failure, we are not a scientific evidence based
profession— we are not learning and we cannot become ethical in our approach to ICT. Instead, we
will become, however unintentionally, a post-ethical and extra-legal field. Civil society requires a
means for logging and evaluating critical incidents, including standard definitions and procedures
used by funders, governments, and local communities, etc., to evaluate the impact of these projects.
In this regard, the imperative to consider ethics must be emphasized as a prerequisite for fulfilling
the obligation to do no harm.
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It should be emphasized that in itself, the absence of empirical evidence of impact and risk
fundamentally makes this project of ICT use problematic. The ethics and evidence of technical
opportunities, limitations, and liabilities are intrinsically entwined into the development of each
other. If we don’t have ethics in our science, we can’t responsibly collect results from evidence.
Conversely, if we don’t have scientifically obtained results from evidence, we can’t shape our
ethics to be inclusive of the likely modalities of our potential activities and manage their intended
and unintended outcomes. Ethics without evidence is impossible. Valid evidence without ethics is
also impossible.
This enterprise also entails renegotiating the ethical compact of the human rights and
humanitarian fields for the digital age: Current ethical doctrine is based on operational and
contextual assumptions from a bygone era (i.e. the 20th century). These “unitary” ethical and
protection doctrines were based on direct information collection of PII from individuals, thus
the ethical compact between providers and advocates with the populations they encountered is
based on a technical reality and value proposition rooted in conceptions of data technologies and
expectations of data control that no longer fully apply. The continued use of outmoded ethics in
the age of ICTs is, in itself, an unethical act. For even the patina of “ethicality” to be restored to
these fields that now more and more rely on ICTs for basic workflows, this “compact” must be
reexamined and ultimately renegotiated.
Finally, in a post-Snowden era when global military surveillance is occurring, it is now a
key part of the humanitarian imperative to be able to demonstrate why using digital data and
platforms in operations does not affect the ethical commitment to do no harm to beneficiaries. Our
task as academics and researchers is to establish empirical evidence and pedagogic narrative of
impact—both positive and negative alike—with clarity and honesty about the current context,
which, increasingly, is defined by cyber-insecurity and cyber-warfare.
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